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FORUM

FREUD'S EGO IN THE COCKPIT
Kelsie M . O'Bryan

Abstract
In the early 1900's, Sigmund Freud theorized the three parts of a person's personality: the id, the ego, and
the superego. The ego controls the id's desires because they may have consequences or not be socially acceptable.
A person experiences defense mechanisms to protect his or her ego. Although psychologists view defense mechanisms
as a typically healthy way to deal with a problem, the aviation industry sees them as dangers to the safety of flights.
Many aircraft accidents have occurred because the pilot had a strong ego, and was unconsciously defending it. Crew
members must learn to recognize defense mechanisms in themselves and in their crew. Once recognized, an antidote
should be applied. Usually, following prescribed procedures by the Federal Aviation Administration or the airline can
help counter the effects of a strong ego. This can make for a safer cockpit.
Psychology
Introduction: The First Ps~choanalvst
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) was amedical doctor,
psychologist, and an influential thinker of the early
twentieth century, but he is best known as the founder of
psychoanalysis. (Romanian Association for Psychoanalysis
Promotion, 1999) According to Time Magazine, the
fhdamental idea of his new science of the time is that, "all
humans are endowed with an unconscious in which potent
sexual and aggressive drives, and defenses against them,
struggle for supremacy, as it were, behind a person's back."
(Gay, 1999) Freud studied stages of development, dream
interpretation, and personalities. He also began the practice
of 'couch therapy.' Many of his ideas have been deemed as
'unscientific' by modem psychologists, but some of Freud's
theories still apply to today's world, especiallyhis theory of
personality. (Thornton, 200 1)
Psvchoanalvtic Theory of Personality
According to Sigmund Freud, the personality is a
tripartite, or composed of three elementsthat work together
to create complex human behaviors: the id, the ego, and the
superego. (He&er, 1999)
The most primitive element of the personality, the
id, is present fiom birth. The id operates according to the
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pleasure principle; its two goals are to seek pleasure and to
avoid pain. The id does not rely on reality or logic, but
rather demands immediate satisfaction for its basic needs,
including those for life (eros) and for aggressionldeath
(thanatos). The id is important to infants because they
cannot meet their basic needs themselves. If they are hungry
or feeling unsafe, the id makes them cry to have their needs
addressed.
Around age three, the second component of
personality, the ego, develops. In 1923, Freud called the
ego, ''that part of the id which has been modified by the
direct influence of the external world." Unlike the id, the
ego understands that others also have needs and desires, and
that actions have consequences."The ego operates based on
the reality principle, which strives to satisfy the id's desires
in realistic and socially appropriate ways." (McLeod, 2007)
The ego is not a sense of right or wrong. It simply seeks an
end that does not harm itself or the id. Usually, the ego can
appease the id's impulses through delayed gratification,
when the behavior can take place at an acceptable time and
place.
A child develops his or her superegoby the time he
or she is five years old. This part of the personality consists
of a person's morals acquired fiom caregivers and from
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9

Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 21, No. 1 [2011], Art. 5

Freud's Ego in the Cockpit
society. The superego controls feelings of right and wrong.
Many consider this to be a person's conscience. It works to
suppress the id's unacceptable urges, like those for sex and
aggression. The superegoalso tries to force the ego to act on
idealistic/moralisticstandards,rather thanjust realistic ones.
(Cherry, The Id, Ego, and Superego: The Structural Model
of Personality, 2005)
Sigmund Freud preached that the key to a healthy
personality is to maintain a balance between the id, the ego,
and the superego. The ego is constantly seeking this healthy
balance. It must be the strongest element so, "it can satisfy
the needs of the id, not upset the superego, and still take into
consideration the reality of every situation." (Hefher,
1999) Freud termed the ego's ability to function despite
these contradicting forces 'ego strength.' "A person with
good ego strength is able to effectively manage these
pressures, while those with too much or too little ego
strength can become too unyielding or too disrupting."
(Hefher, 1999) This research paper will focus largely on
the ego.
Protecting the Ego
When the ego cannot handle the id's demands, the
constraints of reality, and the superego's moral standards,
the person experiences anxiety. According to Freud,
"anxiety is an unpleasant inner state that people seek to
avoid." Anxiety is the first sign that something is wrong,
and the person will then exhibit defense mechanisms to
protect his or her ego. This is typically done unconsciously,
but it may also happen knowingly. Although it is a distortion
of reality, defense mechanisms can simply be a way to adapt
to a situation in order for a person can function normally. At
the same time, they can become unhealthy when overused
to avoid confronting problems. Many exist today, but
Sigmund Freud, and later his daughter Anna, identified the
basic nine defense mechanisms: repression, denial,
rationalization, projection, reaction formation,
intellectualization, regression, displacement, and
sublimation. (Clark, 2004)
First, repression is also known as 'motivated
forgetting.' It acts to keep certain memories out of
conscious awareness, but they continue to influence a
person's behavior. This may have occurred if a person has
a phobia, but doesn't know where it originated fiom. Denial
is repression taken to an extreme level. "Denial is an
outright refusal to admit or recognize that something has
occurred or is currently occurring." It acts to protect the ego
fiom situations it cannot deal with, for example, a doctor's
diagnosis of a terminal illness. (Hefier, 1999)
Next, rationalization is the defense mechanism that

Page 10

https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol21/iss1/5

involvesmaking excusesto defend behavior, simultaneously
avoiding the true reasons for it. This protects the ego's selfesteem by blaming fault on someone or something else, like
when a speeder blames his or her speeding ticket on the
police officer, a lack of signs, or the speedometer. Similarly,
projection is placing your own unacceptable qualities,
feelings, or impulses onto someone else. This will allow a
person to express and criticize the impulse, but without the
ego recognizing it. The threat is eliminated, and self-esteem
is maintained.
Reaction formation is taking the opposite belief,
impulse, or behavior because the true belief causes anxiety.
A modern example of making a reaction formation is when
a secretly gay man engages in many heterosexual affairs to
disguise his homosexuality. The person goes overboard in
the other direction.
Next, intellectualization occurs when a person
avoids seeming unacceptable emotions by focusing on the
intellectual aspects of the situation. Like all defense
mechanisms, intellectualization can have positive
consequences. If a rape victim were to experience
intellectualization,she would educate herself on information
and statistics of rape, take self-defense classes, and possibly
even teach these things to other women and men. Even
though she is making her traumatic experience into a
positive outcome, it is unhealthy to repress the emotional
side of the event. Eventually, those feelings will have to be
addressed.
Regression is when a person moves back in
development to a time when he or she felt safe and secure,
often childhood. It may be as inconspicuous as a student
taking his or her old stuffed animal to college, or as extreme
as an adult throwing a temper tantrum in public.
Finally, displacement involves taking out
hstrations, feelings, or impulses on people or objects that
are less threatening. The less threatening option is referred
to as the scapegoat. This happens every day. An example of
displacement is when a man has a stresshl day at work.
Instead of arguing with his boss and potentially getting
fired, he goes home and yells at his wife or throws an
inanimate object to relieve his anger. In contrast,
sublimation is when a person acts out his or her impulses in
a socially acceptable form. A person with a great need for
order may become a scientist; or a person with excess anger
could choose to be a professional football player. People
who succumb to sublimation are often admired for finding
their 'true calling.' Freud viewed this defense mechanism
as a sign of maturity, allowing people to protect their egos
while functioning normally in a very socially acceptable,
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even productive, way. (Cherry, Defense Mechanisms,2006)
Aviation
How Ego Affects the Cocbit
Like every other profession, pilots are affected by
their ego and their need to protect it. The Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) Aviation Instructor 's Handbook
cautions about the dangers of defense mechanisms in the
cockpit. Ultimately, defense mechanisms are a distortion of
reality. "Thus, they alleviate the symptoms, not the causes,
and do not solve problems."
(Federal Aviation
Administration, 2009) The Handbook goes on to say that
defense mechanisms are unconscious, and therefore, "not
subject to normal conscious checks and balances." In
addition, it says that once the person is aware that he or she
is exhibiting a defense mechanism, his or her behavior
becomes, "an ineffective way of satisfying a need."
Different fiom Freud's view, the FAA sees ego and defense
mechanisms as a threat to safety.
According to Commercial Aviation Safety,
"Interactions [among crew members] are influenced by two
important variables, namely, peer pressure and ego." (Wells
& Rodrigues, 2001) Refening to Freud's definition of ego,
peer pressure is very similar. A young or inexperienced
pilot's id feels the need to prove itself to the superior
captain. It is .the ego's responsibility to do this at an
appropriate place and time. Defense mechanisms will
protect the pilot's self-esteem, but also, potentially alter the
safety of the flight. The book says the pilot may make the
wrong decision because, "the safe course of action may be
perceived as involving an unacceptable loss of face."
Commercial Aviation Safety recognizes that a moderate
amount of ego has a positive effect on motivation and
performance. Obviously, a pilot must be confident in his or
her abilities to safely execute flights. Ego is necessary in the
cockpit, but at the same time, "a strong ego.. .may produce
good leadershipqualities in emergencysituations,but it may
also result in poor crew or resource management." The
domineering personality that comes with a strong ego may
discourage input &om others or, "may disregard established
procedures, previous training, or good airmanship." The
FAA's Advisory Circular 60-22 identifies this strong ego
characteristic as one of the five hazardous attitudes, macho.
This kind of pilot's motto is 'I can do it.' "Pilots with this
type of attitude will try to prove themselves by taking risks
in order to impress others (14); usually, ignoring safety.
Accordingto the Advisory Circular,hazardousattitudes like
this one must be recognized, and then its antidote must be
applied. In this case, the pilot should counter his strong ego
with the phrase, 'taking chances is foolish.' (Federal
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Aviation Administration, 1991)
In a professional crew setting, the most dangerous
aspect of ego may be how it affects communications.
According to a human factors study, "being strong, being
right, maintaining his status and reputation [are all] critical
to the pilot's self-image." (Freud's Personality Factors,
2002) A captain's ego can prevent him or her from
discussing the best course of action with the crew or from
admitting mistakes because it could show a flaw in his or
her abilities. (Captains' egos are likely to be especially
strong if they have experience as a military fighter pilot
because they were initially trained to be self-reliant.) At the
same time, a first officer's ego can keep him or her from
pointing out possible errors that cause accidents for fear of
being disrespectful or embarrassed. A cockpit full of ego
and without constructive communication can be a recipe for
disaster.
Just like instructors have to be on the lookout for
defense mechanisms in their students, crew members should
monitor one another. These are usually brought on by a
personal crisis or another stressful event in the
crewrnember's life. For example, he or she may be going
through a divorce or be financially stressed. The cause could
be almost anything. The Aviation Instructor's Handbook
identifies some symptoms of defense mechanisms: "a
change in personality, angry outbursts, depression, [...]
social withdrawal, preoccupation with certain ideas, or an
inability to concentrate." If another crewmember witnesses
defense mechanisms, he or she is advised to try to discuss
the issue with the affected crewmember. "The main
objective should be to restore motivation and selfconfidence." (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009)
People's egos are fiagile, and must be approached in
delicate ways, although, if necessary, a professional
counselor should be recommended. Although the NTSB has
never cited the cause of an aircraft accident to be due to the
'pilot's ego,' certain phrases signal that that may have been
the case: "pilot failed to overshoot", "descended below
minima", "failed to divert to an alternate", "attempted
operationbeyond experiencelability level", "continued flight
into known adverse weather", etc. (Wells & Rodrigues,
2001)
E x m l e s of Interfering Egos
Proof that pilot's strong egos can compromise the
safety of a flight can be found in many National
TransportationSafety Board (NTSB)reports. It is especially
evident in the following four accidents: the Avjet Aspen
Crash in 2001, the Tenerife Airport Disaster, Garuda
Indonesia Flight 200, and Pinnacle Airlines Flight 370 1.
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On March 29,2001, a Gulfstream I11 operated by
Avjet Corporation was on a chartered flight from the Los
Angeles International Airport (KLAX) to the Aspen-Pitkin
County Airport in Aspen, Colorado (KASE). The flight
initially left KLAX forty-one minutes late due to the
tardiness of the chartering passengers. A Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) was issued to the first officer during his preflight
briefing stating that the instrument approach procedure was
not authorized at night, although the crew continued the
approach after the end of civil twilight, estimated as thirty
minutes after sunset by the crew. On the approach, the crew
reported the runway in sight to the air traffic controller
working the airplane, but their flight path indicates they
never saw it. The NTSB determined the cause of the
accident to be, "the flight crew's operation of the airplane
below the minimum decent altitude (MDA) without an
appropriate visual reference for the runway." Even though
all of their information indicated they should go missed, the
crew continued the approach. This led to the death of fifteen
people.
On the Avjet flight, the pilots obviously had the 'I
can do it' attitude that comes with a strong ego. Combined
with pressure fi-om the paying customers, the captain and
first officer chose to ignore the curfew at KASE, lie to the
controller about seeing the runway, and descend below
MDA into an area of terrain without being able to see it.
They had only flown into this particular airport twice, and
only during daylight conditions. Some believe the crew was
experiencingthe defense mechanism rationalization. If they
were, the pilots wanted it to seem like executing the
approach illegally was due to pressure £tom the paying
customers (this did have some affect on the situation). In
reality, the pilots' bad decision-making was probably
because oftheir macho attitudes. They wanted to prove they
could do it. This overconfidence caused by their strong egos
had dire consequences for everyone on board. (2001 Avjet
Aspen Crash, 2003)
On March 27, 1977, along with many other
airplanes, Pan Am Flight 1736 and KLM Flight 4805, both
Boeing 743, were diverted to Tenerife's Los Rodeos
Airport in the Canary Islands after their airport of intended
landing, the Las Palmas Airport, incurred a small-scale
terrorist attack. Later that day, Las Palmas Airport reopened
to traffic. Because of the unusual congestion, aircraft at
Tenerife had been parked on taxiways, blocking them from
use. For this reason, the controller on duty was back-taxiing
aircraft down the runway to get in position for departure. At
this time, he instructed KLM 4805 to taxi to the end of the
runway, make a one-hundred and eighty degree turn, and
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hold for takeoff. He also taxied Pan Am 1736 down the
runway, but that aircraft was instructed to exit the runway
on a taxiway to their left. By this time, a thick fog had rolled
in, preventingthe tower controller from seeingtheairplanes,
and the airplanes from seeing each other. When KLM 4805
was positioned for takeoff on the runway, the captain
proceeded to release the brakes and set full power. His first
officer stopped him, saying, "Wait, we don't have
clearance!" (Kilroy, 1997) The captain was experiencing
the macho hazardous attitude, and possibly also antiauthority and impulsivity. The first officer then received
departure, but not takeoff clearance, and replied, "We're
now at takeoff," as the captain advanced the throttles. The
controller then told them to standby for takeoff, but the
transmission was 'stepped on' by the Pan Am reporting still
on the runway. Sadly, five-hundred eighty-three people
perished fi-om the decision of the KLM 4805 captain to
takeoff without clearance. (Aviation Sri Lanka, 2008)
The KLM 4805 captain's strong ego and want to
get off the ground after a long unexpected delay affected his
ability to problem solve. He ignored procedure and made his
own decision. The first officer tried to stop him, but after
being assertive once and unsure of himself due to little
experience in the Boeing 747, he did not have the courage
in him to do it again. Some believe the captain was
experiencing reaction formation. He knew he did not have
takeoff clearance, but he wanted to believe he did because
the lack of clearancemade his flight later, causing him more
stress. He chose the belief and behavior opposite to the truth
to appease his ego. Pilots of both aircraft saw the accident
coming just seconds before it happened. KLM 4805
attempted to get airborne early, tail striking the runway, and
Pan Am 1736 tried to taxi off the runway, into the grass, but
their efforts were too late.
Garuda Indonesia Flight 200, was an Indonesian
domestic flight, traveling from Bandara Soekarno Hatta
International Airport to Yogyakarta Adi Sucipto Airport on
March 07, 2007. Ten miles from the Yogyakarta Adi
Sucipto Airport, the crew was given clearance for a visual
approach to runway 09. Ignoring authority, the captain
continued the instrument approach. The recommended top
of descent at this point was 2,500 feet, but the Boeing 737
was almost at an altitude of 4,000 feet. The captain chose to
descend rapidly to achieve glide slope, and the airspeed
increased tremendously. In his approach, the Ground
Proximity Warning System sounded fifteen times, and the
first officer repeatedly called for go-around. The captain's
strong ego told him that he could completethe approach and
land the airplane. Against all common sense, but apparent
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by his actions, he must have been thinking 'I can do it.' The
aircraft eventually touched down eighty-seven knots faster
than landing speed, and the first officer requested a goaround yet again. The captain was determined to be
successful; he never intended to compromise the safety of
the flight. In a post-crash interview, he said, "At the (time of
the crash) I used all ofmy might to save the flight mission."
(Garuda IndonesiaFlight 200 & Captain John Bartels, 2008)
Ultimately, the aircraft overran the runway, killing twentytwo people.
On Garuda Indonesia Flight 200, it has been
speculated that the captain was motivated to get on the
ground by a new Garuda Airlines company policy. Since
fuel costs the company money, it gave pilots who saved it a
conservation bonus in their paycheck. (Garuda Indonesia
Flight 200,2007) The captain may have been experiencing
rationalization. In his head, he could probably justifl
sacrificing the safety of the flight for extra money in his
pocket, as long as the outcome was positive. Unfortunately,
he let his bad decisions go to such an extreme level,
continually refusing to do a go-around, that they were
unrecoverable. The captain was obviously at fault, but the
first officer was not fkee of blame. Garuda Indonesia had a
company policy that allowed the first officer to take control
ofthe aircraft when the captain ignored his recommendation
to go around. Although the first officer did suggest the
proper correction, he did not take charge and fix the
situation. Just like the captain, the first officer's ego
probably affected his ability to problem solve as well. He
did not want to be assertive by taking the controls, and then
be wrong. That would be detrimental to a second-incommand's self-image. But, if he had stepped up, a second
approach could have been successful. (Garuda Indonesia
Flight 200,2009)
Finally, a blatant disregard for rules and procedures
can be the most obvious identifier of a strong ego and can
turn into the most dangerous of situations, especially when
the ego prevents the person fkom admitting his or her
mistakes. On October 14, 2004, Pinnacle Airlines Flight
3701, a Bombardier CL-600-2B 19(CRJ 200), was operating
to reposition the aircraft fiom Little Rock, Arkansas (KLIT)
to Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (KMSP) for a
scheduled passenger flight the next morning. At the time of
the accident, thankfully, only two crewmembers were
aboard the aircraft. This lack of feeling responsible for the
normal fifty lives on board gave the crew the fieedom to
attempt risky maneuvers and push the airplane and
themselves past their limits. On the way up to their original
requested altitude of 33,000 feet, the crew made three erratic
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nose-up pitch inputs and several rudder inputs to experience
G's. The stick shaker protection kept trying to stop this, but
they continued to ovenide it. The crew requested an altitude
of 41,000 feet, which was the CRJ 200's service ceiling in
perfect conditions. On that flight, based on the atmospheric
conditions and aircraft's weight, their maximum altitude for
the 500 feet per minute climb they set the autopilot to was
38,700 feet. (What Went Wrong: The Crash of Flight 3701,
2006) The crew was attempting to 'join the 4-1-0 club.'
This is an unofficial group of pilots who are proud to have
reached the limit of 41,000 in a CRJ 200. The pilots
achieved club status, but they would not make it back on the
ground alive to tell the story.
Upon reaching their new requested altitude, the
controller queried Pinnacle 3701 about their aircraft type
because she was not accustomed to seeing CRJ 200's at an
altitude of 4 1,000 feet. The captain told her, "We don't have
any passengers on board so we decided to have a little fun
and come on up here.. .this is actually our service ceiling."
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2007) From the
captain's bragging, it is obvious that the crew is proud of
their macho attitude. Just seconds after showing off, they
realized that the airplane could not maintain its service
ceiling. Its airspeed was becoming dangerously slow; the
pitch was abnormally high; and the engines could no longer
function after being pushed to 600 degrees above their
maximum operating temperature and without sufficient
oxygen to kel them. After five activations of the
stickshaker,the CRJ 200 aerodynamically stalled, rolled into
its left wing, and flamed out both engines.
To protect their egos, the pilots of Pinnacle 3701
immediately began experiencing denial. If they would have
admitted the double engine failure to the airtrafficcontroller
right away, they could have glided to six different airports
and landed successfully. They didn't want to believe that
they had made a mistake, so they chose to hide that
information and instead, incorrectly executed the checklists
for engine restart. Regardless of their actions, the right
engine probably could have never restarted. Because it was
operating beyond its limits at 300 degrees Celsius above its
recommended temperature, "the ends of the high pressure
turbine blades had liquefied, resolidifying on the low
pressure blades behind them." (What Went Wrong: The
Crash of Flight 370 1,2006) By the time they admitted their
failure to the controller, it was too late. Pinnacle Flight 370 1
crashed two and a halfmiles short ofthe runway at Jefferson
City Airport, killing both crew members on board. (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2007) The pilots let their egos
get in the way of their training and good decision-making
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skills. They made the initial mistake of pushing the aircraft
past its limits, but then failed to correct it by simply
admitting their error to someone who could help, the
controller. As in many similar situations, sadly, the pilots'
strong egos cost them the ultimate pricetheir lives.
Antidotes to Strong Egos
Strong egos can be corrected by following
prescribed procedures and rules. The FAA publishes
regulations, and airliners have standard operatingprocedures
to be followed to try to ensure safety in flight. According to
Darren Smith, an experienced instructor, ego affects a
pilot's flying discipline, including his or her decisionmaking skills. Among others, Mr. Smith suggests recurrent
training and practicing good habits to maintain a safe flying
discipline. Hopefidly, in an emergency situation, the
familiar feeling of following procedures will trigger the
proper strategy to fix the problem. (Smith, 2005) A pilot's

true capabilities can shine in an emergency to do everything
he or she can to solve the problem, or his or her strong ego
can come out to prevent good decision-making.
Conclusion
In the early 1900's, when Freud theorized the
psychoanalytic theory of personalities, he could have never
imagined it would apply to people flying an airplane, but it
does. The ego and the defense mechanisms a person exhibits
to protect it can affect the person's decision-making ability,
no matter what he or she is doing. As seen in the previous
airplane accidents, when a person lets his or her ego
ovemde rational thinking, it can have dire consequences:
lives. For this reason, crews must be trained to recognize
unwanted behavior due to egos in them self and in crew
members. Identifling the problem is the first step in fixing
it, and then an antidote may be implemented. .)
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